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ILLUSORY PROTECTION: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S MISGUIDED 
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION 
PROVISION IN 
HERNANDEZ V. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
William C. Matthews* 
Abstract 
After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White 
resolved the issue of what constitutes an “adverse action” under the 
Title VII anti-retaliation statute, the scope of employer liability was 
substantially broadened. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforced the 
broad intent behind the anti-retaliation statute and acknowledged the 
statute’s remedial purpose. The Fifth Circuit, however, has been 
reluctant to expand employer liability as evidenced through its 
interpretation of the “adverse action” prong relating to coworker 
harassment. More specifically, the Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” 
standard, which is used to judge whether an employer is liable for 
coworker harassment in retaliation for an employee opposing unlawful 
employment activities, conflicts with the underlying purpose of the anti-
retaliation statute. No other circuit has such a stringent requirement and, 
unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit’s unique interpretation prevents many 
plaintiffs from obtaining justifiable relief. The Fifth Circuit applied this 
standard in Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., which illustrated 
the frustrations surrounding the denial of John Ketterer’s retaliation 
claim. By reviewing other circuit courts’ analysis, legislative intent, 
Supreme Court precedent, and public policy, this Note explains how the 
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision is 
misguided and proposes a simple solution to this intricate problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Yellow Transportation, Inc. (YTI), now known as “YRC Freight,”1 
was a leading transporter of industrial, commercial, and retail goods 
throughout North America.2 This multibillion-dollar company had 
shipping terminals located throughout the United States and was known 
for its dedication to safety, service, and the community.3 The company’s 
core values included, “[w]ork safely,” “[d]emonstrate good citizenship,” 
                                                                                                                     
 1. YTI was recently renamed “YRC Freight” and is a freight transportation division of 
YRC Worldwide, Inc. Mary Mitchell, Yellow Transportation Inc. Discrimination Case Shows 
Why Racism Is so Frustrating, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/mitchell/13551623-452/yellow-transportation-inc-discrimina 
tion-case-shows-why-racism-is-so-frustrating.html; see also YRC Freight Profile, YRC 
FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/about/profile.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). Even though YRC 
Freight is the company that was formed after YTI merged with Roadway Express, Inc., I will be 
referring to YTI throughout this Note because this is the company that existed at the time John 
Ketterer brought his Title VII claims against YTI.  
 2. YRC Freight Profile, supra note 1. 
 3. See id. 
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and “[a]ct with integrity.”4 “With more than 160 combined years of 
moving big shipments,”5 YTI was, safe to say, an accomplished freight 
company. However, some of YTI’s terminals did not live up to YTI’s 
esteemed corporate citizenship.6 The Dallas, Texas terminal, in 
particular, exemplified a workplace that failed to meet YTI’s 
“commitment to diversity.”7 
To say that the Dallas terminal was “a work-place that could be quite 
mean-spirited, crude, and insulting” would be an understatement.8 The 
terminal was rife with racial prejudice, and harassment was common.9 
For example, white employees broadcasted racial slurs such as “nigger” 
and “wetback” over company radios, and employees tied nooses onto 
the terminal’s dock.10 Racially offensive graffiti, drawings, and cartoons 
were also located throughout the Dallas terminal.11 Words such as 
“greaser,” “taco bender,” “cotton picker,” “jiggaboo,” and “[a]ll niggers 
must die” are just a few examples of the language that was scattered 
around the workplace.12 
To make matters worse, this abuse also targeted employees who 
associated with minority employees.13 One of these employees was a 
white dockworker named John Ketterer (Ketterer), who had worked at 
YTI’s Dallas terminal since 1990.14 It was “well known to others at the 
facility” that Ketterer had “longstanding friendships with African-
American and Hispanic co-workers.”15 As a result of these 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Code of Business Conduct, YRC WORLDWIDE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.yrcw.com/
corporategovernance/code_of_business_conduct.pdf. 
 5. Awards, YRC FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/award/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 
2014). 
 6. See, e.g., Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at 
*1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008) (noting a discharge for “engaging in outrageous conduct, 
including threatening a coworker”); EEOC v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 09 C 7693, 2010 WL 
2891673, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2010) (describing a class action where employees sued YTI 
for various claims, including employment discrimination). 
 7. Diversity, YRC FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/career-resource-center/diversity.html 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 8. See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 
sub nom. Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012). 
 9. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, Hernandez, 670 F.3d 644 (No. 11-1361) 
(“Racist language was common. Dockworkers, and at least one supervisor, frequently uttered 
racial slurs and insults directed at African-American and Hispanic employees.”). 
 10. Id. at 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Transcript of Record at 5092–93, 5100, 5113–15, 5155; Hernandez, 670 F.3d 644 
(No. 11-1361). 
 13. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 655. 
 14. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 15. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 7; see Transcript of Record, supra 
note 12, at 4350, 5109, 5167. 
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relationships, white coworkers frequently called Ketterer a “nigger 
lover” and other racial slurs.16 This verbal abuse eventually escalated 
into coworkers vandalizing Ketterer’s personal property and work area. 
For example, coworkers glued his locker shut, cut his vehicle’s brake 
lines, put human excrement in his lunchbox, and greased his work 
vehicle.17 Ketterer began to change his daily routine for the sole purpose 
of avoiding as much workplace harassment as possible.18 He even began 
to take his breaks in a different room and stopped using the company 
restroom.19  
After finding enough courage to stand up to the continuous barrage 
of harassment, Ketterer and other minority employees protested against 
workplace discrimination outside of the Dallas terminal around 
November 2004.20 Little did Ketterer know, this protest would only 
exacerbate the problem.21 As the abuse escalated, Ketterer began 
receiving treatment for depression, headaches, anxiety, and sleep 
disorders.22 Ketterer complained to management on multiple occasions, 
but management did nothing to curtail the behavior against him and the 
minorities working for YTI.23 Furthermore, some complaints by 
employees “were posted on a public bulletin board, leading to even 
more harassment of the complaining employees.”24 
Realizing YTI would not redress this constant workplace abuse, 
Ketterer and seven other employees sued YTI in federal court alleging 
YTI was liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Texas Commission on Human 
Rights Act (TCHRA).25 
After this brief but shocking explanation of what Ketterer endured at 
YTI, one would expect that, provided he had adequate legal 
representation, he would receive some sort of legal remedy through his 
suit against YTI. Unfortunately, the trial and appellate courts awarded 
Ketterer no legal remedy, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5170, 5246–48, 5492, 5836–37. 
 17. Id. at 5252, 5263, 5265. 
 18. Id. at 5258. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 5236, 5248, 5256, 5837–38. 
 21. See Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and 
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933 (2007) (discussing how 
“[i]ndividuals who complain about workplace discrimination are frequently labeled as 
troublemakers by those in positions of authority within the organization”). 
 22. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5252, 5257. 
 23. Id. at 5237–38, 5247–48. 
 24. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
 25. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and TEX. 
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001–.556 (West 2006)). 
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a writ of certiorari.26 The most troubling aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding was the court’s interpretation of Ketterer’s “retaliation” claim 
under Title VII.27 The court held that YTI was not liable under Title 
VII’s “anti-retaliation provision” because the adverse actions against 
Ketterer were performed by “ordinary employees” and were not “In 
furtherance of the employer’s business.”28 This interpretation of the 
anti-retaliation provision is impractical and differs from the analysis of 
all other circuits.29 Furthermore, this decision could have disastrous 
consequences for the millions of employees who work in the Fifth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction.  
With federal retaliation claims increasing significantly over the past 
ten-to-fifteen years, issues concerning employer liability are becoming 
more pervasive in our country’s legal system.30 For this and many other 
reasons, this Note aims to address a small part of the employer liability 
landscape and to shed light on the Fifth Circuit’s incorrect interpretation 
of the anti-retaliation provision. Part I explains the background of the 
anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); the purpose behind 
the statute; and how retaliation claims are brought under Title VII. Part 
II discusses the confusion surrounding the proper test to apply to prima 
facie cases of retaliation and how the Supreme Court resolved this issue. 
Part III explains the Fifth Circuit case Hernandez v. Yellow 
Transportation, Inc.,31 and more specifically, Ketterer’s retaliation 
claim against YTI. Part III also describes how the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of retaliation claims involving coworker harassment 
differs from all other circuits. Part IV identifies the problems with the 
Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the anti-retaliation provision and proposes a 
solution to remedy the Fifth Circuit’s misguided interpretation. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 26. Docket Files, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1361.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014); Hernandez v. 
Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 656–58 (5th Cir. 2012); Arrieta, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1. 
 27. The provision at issue was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 28. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 3. 
 30. Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1997–FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 31. 670 F.3d 644. 
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I.  DRUMROLL PLEASE: INTRODUCING THE “ANTI-RETALIATION” 
PROVISION 
Before exploring the legal ramifications of Ketterer’s suit against 
YTI, one should understand the origins and purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision. What makes the statute important in the 
employment context? How does one actually file a retaliation claim 
under Title VII? These questions should be answered to fully 
understand why the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is misguided. 
A.  The Origin of the Anti-retaliation Provision 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is part of § 704(a) of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
in response to the racial turbulence that swept the nation during the 
early 1960’s.33 The catalyst for these events began on June 11, 1963 
when President Kennedy sent National Guard troops to the University 
of Alabama to enforce a desegregation order.34 This event, coupled with 
months of riots and demonstrations stemming from racial tension, 
forced the federal government to take action.35 In addition to publicly 
denouncing the racially-induced violence, President Kennedy sent 
proposed legislation to Congress to help alleviate America’s equality 
problems.36  
The proposed legislation was originally titled the “Civil Rights Act 
of 1963.”37 It was divided into eight Titles, each of which dealt with a 
separate issue under Title VII of the proposed act. 38 In general, the bill 
“was . . . a remedial measure designed to begin the process of 
overturning a century’s worth of Jim Crow [laws].”39 Furthermore, Title 
VII was intended to benefit not just African Americans, but all of 
America.40 This is evident when looking at the legislative history “in the 
                                                                                                                     
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 33. Michael J. Fellows, Civil Rights—Shades of Race: An Historically Informed Reading 
of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 397 (2004); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth, and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 670 (1995) (explaining how racially fueled events in 
Birmingham, Alabama, caused President Kennedy to have a civil rights bill drafted). 
 34. CIVIL RIGHTS 1960–66, at 217–18 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1967); Fellows, supra note 33, 
at 397. See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 75 (1992). 
 35. Fellows, supra note 33, at 398–99. 
 36. CIVIL RIGHTS 1960–66, supra note 34, at 175. 
 37. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the same bill as the one cited here, but, because it was 
not passed until the following year, was retitled with the year 1964. Fellows, supra note 33, at 
400. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 401 (footnote omitted). 
 40. Id. at 405. 
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context of the larger social and historical movements” because 
theoretically, a more productive African American betters both himself 
and the community around him.41 
B.  The Purpose of the Anti-retaliation Provision 
As could be expected, the general purpose of Title VII is to protect 
individuals from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.42 Oftentimes, because Title VII is known for prohibiting 
employer discrimination, retaliation claims are brought in conjunction 
with discrimination claims under Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
provision.43 By definition, the “two provisions work in tandem to 
protect workers.”44 However, the language of the anti-retaliation 
provision is much broader than the statutory language of the anti-
discrimination provision. 
Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.45 
Thus, for an anti-discrimination claim to be valid, “the difference in 
treatment must be related to the employment relationship.”46 This 
notion is illustrated in subsection (1) where the unlawful employment 
practice is “with respect to [the employee’s] compensation, terms, 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. 
 42. Marilee L. Miller, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a Broad Reading of Title 
VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505, 505 (footnotes omitted); See also Lindsay 
Roshkind, Employment Law: An Adverse Action Against Employers: The Supreme Court’s 
Expansion of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 59 FLA. L. REV. 707 (2007) (discussing how 
the goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is “to compensate individuals who have suffered as a 
result of an unlawful employment practice”). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 44. Jessica L. Beeler, Comment, Turning Title VII’s Protection Against Retaliation into a 
Never-Fulfilled Promise, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 141, 144 (2008). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 46. Beeler, supra note 44, at 144. 
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conditions, or privileges.”47  
However, this qualifying language does not exist in the anti-
retaliation provision. The anti-retaliation provision states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-
the-job training programs, to discriminate against any 
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.48  
Nothing in the anti-retaliation provision specifies whether the 
discrimination must be related to certain aspects of employment.49 The 
statute simply says that an employer cannot discriminate against an 
employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice.50 
Furthermore, the anti-retaliation statute does not explain how “harmful 
the difference in treatment must be in order to constitute retaliation.”51 
Thus, because “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion” of statutory language, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress intended for the anti-retaliation provision to 
have a broad application that differs from the anti-discrimination 
provision.52 
Additionally, while discrimination and retaliation claims are usually 
brought in conjunction with one another, a plaintiff does not have to be 
successful on a discrimination claim to still have a valid retaliation 
claim.53 This reinforces the notion that courts have interpreted the anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions to be similar yet 
sufficiently distinct from one another.54 The Supreme Court bolstered 
                                                                                                                     
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 49. Beeler, supra note 44, at 145. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 51. Beeler, supra note 44, at 145. 
 52. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66 (2006) (holding that it is 
not “anomalous to read the [anti-retaliation provision] to provide broader protection for victims 
of retaliation than for . . . victims of . . . discrimination”). 
 53. Archuleta v. Colo. Dep’t of Insts., Div. of Youth Servs., 936 F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
 54. See id. at 487 n.2. 
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this argument in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White 
and added that the anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination statutes 
should not be limited by each other.55 Before exploring the problems 
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez,56 the procedural aspects 
of a retaliation claim are important to understand. 
C.  Procedural Details of Retaliation Claims Under Title VII 
Title VII protections are in place because they can provide a remedy 
to any employee who feels that his or her employer has treated him or 
her unlawfully.57 This unlawful treatment can range from racially based 
demotions to termination of employment in retaliation for participating 
in lawfully protected activities.58 An employee initiates a retaliation 
claim by first filing a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).59 The EEOC has the authority to 
“investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary 
compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil 
actions against employers . . . named in a discrimination charge.”60 As it 
pertains to retaliation claims that may be pursued in court, a 
“potential . . . plaintiff must always file a charge with the EEOC and 
seek a right-to-sue letter before going to court to pursue the retaliation 
claim.”61 
After an employee has obtained the right to sue from the EEOC, the 
employee must file a retaliation claim against his or her employer and 
has the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.62 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must satisfy 
the elements laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.63 Under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework, to establish a prima facie case of 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64 (holding that “the antiretaliation provision, unlike the 
substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and 
conditions of employment”). 
 56. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 57. Beeler, supra note 44, at 146. 
 58. Id. Lawfully protected activities include protesting workplace discrimination, filing 
complaints to management, filing lawsuits, and many more. 
 59. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)–(d) (2011) (explaining how before the actual claim is filed, 
the employee making the claim must first consult a counselor in order to try and resolve the 
issue). 
 60. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
 61. Beeler, supra note 44, at 147 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (2006)). 
 62. See John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 543–44 (2007) (stating that an employee must “establish[] a prima 
facie case of retaliation using circumstantial evidence”). 
 63. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). “Even though the Supreme Court introduced this indirect 
proof scheme for substantive discrimination claims, lower courts universally have adapted it to 
retaliation cases as well.” Sanchez, supra note 62, at 542–43; e.g., McMillan v. Rust Coll., Inc., 
710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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retaliation the plaintiff must prove that: “(1) she engaged in statutorily 
protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3) a causal 
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse 
action.”64 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove the prima facie case of 
retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence.65 
If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie retaliation case, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to provide a “legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”66 The 
defendant’s burden of proof is light in comparison to the plaintiff’s 
because the defendant simply needs to produce evidence that raises a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant acted in a 
discriminatory manner against the plaintiff.67 If the defendant proffers 
legitimate evidence that rebuts plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the burden 
of proof then switches back to the plaintiff to persuade the court that the 
defendant’s reason is merely a pretext.68 In other words, the plaintiff 
must prove that “the employer was in fact motivated by retaliation in 
making its employment decision.”69 The court resolves these procedural 
issues, and, as will be explained later, the Fifth Circuit differs from the 
majority interpretation in its analysis of the second element of a prima 
facie retaliation claim. 
II.  IT’S A BIRD, IT’S A PLANE, IT’S BURLINGTON: BURLINGTON’S 
MUCH NEEDED GUIDANCE 
 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White was a pivotal 
case for employment lawyers across the country. Until Burlington, 
circuits applied different standards to their “adverse action” analysis 
when deciding retaliation claims. Burlington provided much needed 
guidance to the circuits and helped alleviate most concerns as to the 
proper interpretation of prima facie retaliation claims. But, 
unfortunately for John Ketterer, Burlington did not resolve all questions 
related to the adverse action prong. 
 
A.  Pre-Burlington: A History of Circuit Court Inconsistency  
While the requirements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
seem rather straightforward, courts have struggled with the second 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 543–44 (footnotes omitted); See, e.g., Taylor v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 65. E.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 66. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long v. 
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981). 
 68. Id. at 255 n.10. 
 69. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 544. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/11
2014] ILLUSORY PROTECTION 1439 
 
prong of the retaliation analysis.70 The second prong of a prima facie 
retaliation claim is that the employee suffered an “adverse action.”71 
Prior to Burlington,72 courts did not consistently define what constituted 
an “adverse action.”73 This inconsistency was primarily caused by the 
differing interpretations of the phrase “discriminate against” in the anti-
retaliation statute.74 This confusion resulted in three majority 
interpretations of the correct meaning of “adverse action.”75 
1.  The “Ultimate Employment Actions” Standard 
The Fifth Circuit adopted the “ultimate employment actions” 
standard.76 This was the minority interpretation and in accordance with 
its atypical analysis in Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit was unsurprisingly 
this standard’s most consistent follower.77 The crux of this 
interpretation was that only ultimate employment actions such as wages, 
benefits, hiring, firing, and demotions satisfy the “adverse action” 
standard of a retaliation claim.78 Even if the action was clearly 
retaliatory in nature, any lesser actions such as “a negative performance 
evaluation, an uncomfortable work environment, or lateral job transfers 
with similar pay” do not qualify as an “adverse action.”79 The Fifth 
Circuit argued that Title VII was created to deal with ultimate 
employment decisions, not decisions made by employers that may have 
some “tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”80 Thus, if a 
worker who protests workplace discrimination is given a negative 
performance review solely because of his protest, the Fifth Circuit was 
content with holding that the negative review did not constitute an 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–42 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 71. Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 72. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 73. Megan E. Mowrey, Establishing Retaliation for Purposes of Title VII, 111 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 893, 894 (2007). 
 74. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57. 
 75. See Miller, supra note 42, at 513–23 (discussing different interpretations of the term 
“adverse action”). 
 76. Id. at 513. 
 77. Id. The Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit were the other circuit courts that used to 
abide by the “ultimate employment actions” standard. E.g., Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 
126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 78. See, e.g., Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Title VII was 
designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by 
employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”). 
 79. Miller, supra note 42, at 513; e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th 
Cir.1999) (holding that “employment actions are not adverse where pay, benefits, and level of 
responsibility remain the same”). 
 80. Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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“adverse action” against the employee. Although alarming because of 
the numerous ways an employer could lawfully retaliate against an 
employee, this standard was fortunately the least followed 
interpretation. 
2.  The “Materially Adverse” Standard 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the “materially adverse” 
standard.81 Most courts defined the materially adverse standard as a 
retaliatory action that “must result in an adverse effect on the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”82 In other words, there must 
be a close relationship between the retaliatory act and employment.83 
Thus, unlike the “ultimate employment action” standard, the “materially 
adverse” test considered hostile or abusive work environments as 
adverse actions against an employee.84 This is because an abusive work 
environment undoubtedly can negatively affect the employee’s 
“conditions . . . of employment.”85 The “materially adverse” test did 
not, however, include minor complaints and other actions that were not 
employment related.86 Unfortunately, this standard produced many 
unpredictable results because of courts’ subjective interpretations of 
which actions actually qualified as “employment related.”87 
3.  The “Deterrence” Standard 
The third and final standard was known as the “deterrence” 
standard.88 The “deterrence” standard took a more lenient approach and 
mirrored the EEOC’s definition of an adverse employment action.89 
Plaintiffs must first file their claims with the EEOC before bringing 
their action in federal court.90 The EEOC defines its adverse action 
standard as “an action taken to try to keep someone from opposing a 
discriminatory practice, or from participating in an employment 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Miller, supra note 42, at 515–17; Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 
1189 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 82. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (brackets omitted). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Miller, supra note 42, at 515. 
 85. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. See id. (excluding mention of minor complaints and other actions not employment 
related in the standard of retaliation). 
 87. See Miller, supra note 42, at 515 (“[T]he Second Circuit has evaluated each case 
based on its specific fact pattern.”). 
 88. Id. at 520. 
 89. See id. (discussing the EEOC’s definition of retaliation). 
 90. See supra Section I.B. 
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discrimination proceeding.”91 Other courts defined the “deterrence” 
standard as an action that would “dissuade[] a reasonable [employee] 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”92  
Thus, this standard covered retaliatory measures such as lateral 
transfers, negative reviews, and changes in work schedules.93 The 
reasoning was that these types of employment actions were likely to 
deter employees from participating in protected activities, such as 
protesting work discrimination or filing claims against their employer.94 
Because the intent behind the anti-retaliation statute is to protect 
employees who have participated in lawfully protected activities from 
retaliatory acts at the hands of their employers, excluding these 
retaliatory acts is simply ignoring the intent and meaning behind the 
anti-retaliation statute. Therefore, if a court does not qualify these types 
of employment actions as “adverse,” that court is essentially 
circumventing the fundamental purpose behind the anti-retaliation 
statute.95 With three different interpretations of what “adverse action” 
truly meant, circuit courts needed further guidance in their analyses of 
the anti-retaliation statute.  
B.  Burlington Finally Resolves the “Adverse Action” Debate  
The Supreme Court finally provided such guidance through its 
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.96 In 
Burlington, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company 
(Burlington) hired Sheila White in June 1997 to work as a “track 
laborer” at the company’s Tennessee stockyard.97 Shortly after hiring 
her, Burlington reassigned White to a more desirable position as a 
“forklift operator.”98 Only a couple of months into the job, White’s 
supervisor began making sexist remarks to White and continually 
insulted her in front of her coworkers.99 Eventually, White complained 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Facts About Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 92. Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that Title VII’s statutory 
retaliation clauses prohibit adverse action based on retaliatory motive aimed to deter employees 
from making a charge of discrimination). 
 93. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 97. Id. at 57 (explaining that a track laborer is “a job that involves removing and replacing 
track components, transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo 
spillage from the right-of-way”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Her supervisor continually told her that women should not be working in his 
department and he made numerous inappropriate remarks about her in front of her male 
coworkers. Id. at 58. 
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to Burlington management about her supervisor’s behavior, and, shortly 
after complaining, White was reassigned to her old position as a 
standard “track laborer.”100  
After being reassigned, White filed a complaint with the EEOC, 
asserting that her job reassignment amounted to unlawful gender 
discrimination and retaliation for complaining to management about her 
supervisor’s behavior.101 Only a few days later, Burlington suspended 
White without pay for insubordination resulting from a workplace 
dispute.102 After exhausting her available remedies through the EEOC, 
White filed suit in federal court alleging that Burlington retaliated 
against her by changing her job responsibilities and suspending her for 
thirty-seven days without pay.103 The district court ruled in favor of 
White, and, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
decision but was still conflicted as to the proper standard to apply in 
regards to the “adverse action” analysis.104 
After granting certiorari to resolve this disagreement, the Supreme 
Court explained that the anti-retaliation provision “is intended to 
provide ‘exceptionally broad protection’ for protestors of discriminatory 
employment practices.”105 This is evident when comparing the language 
of the anti-retaliation provision and the anti-discrimination provision.106 
The anti-discrimination provision contains language such as, “hire,” 
“discharge,” “compensation,” “privileges of employment,” and “status 
as an employee,” all of which limit the provision’s scope to “actions 
that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.”107 The 
anti-retaliation provision contains no such language that limits its scope 
to employment or workplace conditions.108  
The Court interpreted this difference in language as purposeful 
because of the different objectives served under both provisions.109 The 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. Management “explained that the re-assignment reflected co-workers’ complaints 
that, in fairness, a ‘more senior man’ should have the ‘less arduous and cleaner job’ of forklift 
operator.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. The event of insubordination was in dispute between White and her new supervisor 
and through internal grievance procedures, Burlington later concluded that White had not been 
insubordinate. Id. She later was reinstated with “backpay for the 37 days she was suspended.” 
Id. at 58–59. 
 103. Id. at 59. 
 104. Id. 
 105. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, EEOC, INTERPRETIVE MANUAL: A REFERENCE MANUAL TO 
TITLE VII LAW FOR COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION § 491.2, at 383 (1972) [hereinafter EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL], cited with 
approval in Burlington, 548 U.S. at 65. 
 106. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61–63. 
 107. Id. at 62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 108. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 62. 
 109. Id. at 63. 
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anti-discrimination provision intends to prevent, in the workplace, 
individuals from being discriminated against because of their status.110 
To accomplish this goal, Congress only needed to prohibit employment-
related discrimination.111 The anti-retaliation provision, however, 
intends to “prevent[] an employer from interfering (through retaliation) 
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of [Title 
VII’s] basic guarantees.”112 Simply prohibiting employment-related 
discrimination would not accomplish this objective because there are 
many effective ways an employer can retaliate against an employee that 
are not strictly employment related.113 Thus, Burlington held that the 
scope of the anti-retaliation provision is not limited to actions affecting 
employment or even actions occurring at the workplace.114  
Through this decision, the Court expressly rejected the “ultimate 
employment action” standard because of that standard’s adherence to 
excluding any action unrelated to the employment relationship.115 
Instead, the Court adopted more of a “deterrence” standard, as followed 
by the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. The Court explained that the 
anti-retaliation provision only covers employer actions that would have 
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.116 Justice Stephen 
Breyer defined this materially adverse standard as employer 
actions that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”117 
While Justice Breyer claimed that the standard was objective, it 
seems clear that there is some subjective element.118 Courts use an 
objective standard to evaluate whether a worker was reasonable in 
being deterred from bringing a retaliation claim.119 This allows a court 
to avoid guessing whether a plaintiff would be deterred from bringing a 
retaliation claim because of some unusual subjective reason that is 
difficult to verify.120 However, “[c]ontext matters” and, thus, there 
should be a certain degree of subjective analysis applied to the 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. Employment-related discrimination refers to aspects of employment that fell under 
the “ultimate employment actions” standard discussed in Subsection II.A.1. This includes 
wages, hiring, firing, and benefits. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. For a discussion of the ways that employers can effectively retaliate against 
employees through actions not employment related, which in Burlington means actions that are 
not “ultimate employment actions,” see supra Subsection II.A.1. 
 114. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67. 
 115. For a review and explanation of the “ultimate employment actions” standard, see 
supra Subsection II.A.1. 
 116. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. 
 117. Id. at 57. 
 118. Id. at 68–69; see Beeler, supra note 44, at 152. 
 119. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. 
 120. Id. at 68–69. 
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retaliation claim.121 Justice Breyer illustrated this point by using an 
example where changing an employee’s hours may make little 
difference to many workers, but to a young mother with school-age 
children, it could make her life exceedingly more difficult.122 
Thus, the Court held that Burlington’s act of reassigning White to a 
less desirable position after she complained to management was 
materially adverse and, therefore, violated the anti-retaliation statute.123 
The act was materially adverse because any reasonable employee, after 
observing how White’s discrimination complaint was handled, would 
think twice before complaining to management in fear of being demoted 
to a less desirable position.124 Furthermore, the Court held that even 
though White was awarded full back pay for her thirty-seven day 
suspension, an indefinite suspension without pay is in and of itself a 
deterrent for an employee who is thinking about reporting a charge of 
workplace discrimination.125 Thirty-seven days of an unpaid suspension 
can be a serious financial hardship for most employees and a strong 
deterrent against bringing a discrimination complaint.126  
After Burlington defined the test used to determine what constitutes 
an “adverse action,” the circuits finally had a unitary standard they 
could follow when analyzing retaliation claims. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court did not resolve all issues surrounding the “adverse 
action” prong of a prima facie retaliation claim. In particular, the 
question is still unresolved as to whether an employer is liable under the 
anti-retaliation statute if coworkers retaliate against an employee for 
participating in lawfully protected activities and the employer tolerates 
it. This issue and many other retaliation questions are discussed in 
Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.127 
  
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 69 (“[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the 
particular circumstances.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 71. 
 124. Id. at 73. 
 125. Id. at 71–73. 
 126. Id. at 72–73. 
 127. 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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III.  THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF HERNANDEZ V. YELLOW 
TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
A.  The Fifth Circuit’s Controversial Decision 
As explained in the Introduction, John Ketterer had worked for YTI 
for fourteen years before filing suit against the company in 2006.128 
After viewing firsthand the way minority employees were treated by 
many white coworkers, Ketterer sympathized with the minority 
employees and associated almost exclusively with them.129 For his 
empathy, white coworkers verbally and physically harassed Ketterer for 
years.130 Eventually, after a black employee was unexpectedly 
discharged, Ketterer and other minority coworkers picketed outside of 
YTI to protest workplace discrimination.131 The protests were 
considered lawfully protected activities because the protests opposed 
workplace discrimination, which is an unlawful employment practice 
under the anti-retaliation provision,132 In other words, the purpose of the 
anti-retaliation provision is to protect employees who oppose unlawful 
employment practices, and because the protests were opposing unlawful 
employment practices, the protests were held to be lawfully protected 
activities.133 “This finding is not in dispute.”134  
Thus, considering the anti-retaliation provision only protects 
employees if there was a causal connection between an employee 
engaging in protected conduct and suffering an adverse action, the Fifth 
Circuit limited its analysis to events after the protests began.135 This is 
because retaliatory conduct can only occur as a reaction to some event 
or action and in this case, it was after Ketterer participated in protests 
against YTI. Ketterer claimed that after participating in the November 
2004 protests, the harassment by his coworkers continued and 
escalated.136 On a day when he was not protesting, Ketterer was called 
“shitbag” over the company radio and asked why he was not across the 
street with his minority friends.137 Additionally, Ketterer claimed that a 
coworker threw a lit firecracker at him.138 Ketterer finally complained to 
two of his dock supervisors in 2005, after several weeks of being circled 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 129. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 4350, 5492–93. 
 130. E.g., id. at 5170. 
 131. Id. at 5236, 5248, 5256, 5837–38. 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 133. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5243, 5247–48. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 5152. 
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in the parking lot by his coworkers in their vehicles.139 Unfortunately, 
YTI did nothing to curtail this workplace harassment.140 Realizing this 
behavior would continue as long as YTI did not ameliorate the situation, 
Ketterer and seven other employees sued YTI in federal court alleging, 
among other things, that YTI was liable under Title VII.141 
After filing suit in district court, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of YTI in regards to Ketterer’s retaliation claim.142 
As to the first prong, the district court held that Ketterer had offered 
evidence to show he had engaged in protected activity by protesting 
YTI.143 As to the second prong (suffered an adverse action) and third 
prong (causation), Ketterer alleged that:  
(1) coworkers called him racial names; (2) a coworker 
threw a firecracker at him; (3) a group of coworkers 
intimidated him by circling him with their buggies while he 
was in the yard; (4) his supervisors stared at him and did 
not have casual conversations with him; (5) he was 
assigned more work and dirtier jobs; and (6) he was 
discharged and reinstated without backpay following an 
altercation with a coworker.144 
The trial court held that “[a] reasonable jury could not [have 
found] . . . the first three acts imputable to YTI, because they were made 
by ordinary employees and were not made in furtherance of YTI’s 
business.”145 The court held that the fourth allegation was not materially 
adverse because it would not have discouraged a reasonable employee 
from making a discrimination claim.146 Ketterer did not produce enough 
evidence for the fifth allegation to overcome summary judgment, and 
the sixth allegation lacked sufficient evidence of a causal link between 
the action and Ketterer’s participation in protesting, the protected 
activity.147 Thus, largely because Ketterer did not satisfy the “adverse 
action” prong, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 5247–48 (describing how on numerous occasions, Ketterer would finish work 
and as he walked to the parking lot to leave, his coworkers would circle him in their work 
vehicles in menacing, threatening, and intimidating ways). 
 140. Id. at 5248. 
 141. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 142. Id. at *29 (“The court grants summary judgment dismissing all of 
plaintiffs’ . . . retaliation claims . . . .”). 
 143. Id. at *18. 
 144. Id. at *22. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. The trial court also stated that even if Ketterer could establish causation, “YTI has 
provided evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [his] discharge and 
reinstatement without backpay.” Id. 
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YTI. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that 
Ketterer did not suffer any adverse employment actions.148 The Fifth 
Circuit stated that allegations one through three, addressing whether the 
incidents of coworker harassment were valid, were irrelevant because 
they were “perpetrated by . . . ordinary employees [and] . . . the alleged 
harassment [was not] committed in furtherance of Yellow 
Transportation’s business.”149 As to allegations four and five, the Fifth 
Circuit held that they were not supported by evidence nor had Ketterer 
established a causal link between the actions and the protests.150 Lastly, 
the Fifth Circuit held that Ketterer’s allegation that he was reinstated 
without back pay151 was without merit because he failed to 
“demonstrate that ‘but for’ his participation in protected activities, he 
would not have been reinstated without back-pay.”152 
This Note is primarily concerned with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of 
allegations one through three, addressing coworker harassment. The 
Fifth Circuit’s standard for evaluating coworker retaliatory harassment 
is troubling. Unlike any other circuit, the Fifth Circuit maintains that if 
an employer tolerates coworker harassment against an employee in 
retaliation for that employee opposing unlawful employment practices, 
the actions of that employee “are not imputable to their employer unless 
they are conducted ‘in furtherance of the employer’s business.’”153 
Applied to Hernandez, the court explained that the extent of coworker 
harassment that Ketterer endured and whether YTI did anything to curb 
this abuse is irrelevant as a matter of law.154 The Fifth Circuit was only 
concerned with whether the coworkers’ actions were conducted in 
furtherance of YTI—not the severity of the coworkers’ actions or 
whether YTI tolerated the harassment in retaliation for Ketterer’s 
participation in the protests. As Part IV explains, the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard is contrary to the intent of the anti-retaliation statute, differs 
from Supreme Court precedent, and is almost impossible to satisfy. But 
first, what are the other standards that circuits apply to situations like 
Hernandez? 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 149. Id. at 657 (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 150. Id. at 658. 
 151. “A common remedy for wage violations,” back pay is defined as “an order that the 
employer make up the difference between what the employee was paid and the amount he or she 
should have been paid.” Back Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/
backpay.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 152. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 658; see Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate a 
conflict in substantial evidence on the ultimate issue of but-for causation). 
 153. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (quoting Long, 88 F.3d at 306). 
 154. Id. 
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B.  The Fifth Circuit’s Self-Inflicted Loneliness 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that successful retaliation claims are 
contingent on proof that the harassment, if committed by ordinary 
employees, is in furtherance of the employer’s business is completely 
unprecedented.155 To begin, the First,156 Second,157 Third,158 Sixth,159 
Seventh,160 Ninth,161 and Tenth162 Circuits have expressly held that a 
Title VII retaliation claim can be based on the employer’s toleration of 
harassment by coworkers.163 These circuits apply different variations of 
a negligence standard to measure employer liability and typically hold 
that an employer can be liable for retaliation “if it ‘knew or should have 
known about the harassment’ but tolerated or acquiesced in it.”164 If this 
standard was applied in Hernandez, Ketterer would most likely have 
prevailed on his retaliation claim against YTI and received some form 
of relief for YTI’s toleration of coworkers’ behavior towards Ketterer 
and other minority employees.  
In Knox v. Indiana, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to hold 
that “employers can be liable for co-worker actions when they know 
about and fail to correct the offensive conduct.”165 In Knox, a woman 
filed a sexual harassment complaint against her coworkers and 
subsequently suffered “fellow worker harassment and vicious 
gossip.”166 After her employer waited more than a month to do anything 
about the harassment, she filed a Title VII retaliation claim against her 
employer.167 The Seventh Circuit eventually held that the employer was 
liable because of its “acquiescence” and emphasized that “[n]othing 
indicates why . . . retaliating against a complainant by permitting her 
fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title 
                                                                                                                     
 155. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 3; Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136 
(2012) (No. 11-1361) (observing that all courts other than the Fifth Circuit have required proof 
of the harassment being committed in furtherance of the employer’s business). 
 156. E.g., Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 157. E.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 
1999). Additionally, Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 702 F.3d 
685, 698 (2d Cir. 2012), follows verbatim the “material adverse action” standard established by 
Burlington and clarifies any doubt surrounding the standard used in Richardson. Rivera 
abrogates rulings different from the retaliation analysis used in Richardson. 
 158. E.g., Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 159. E.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 345 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 160. E.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 161. E.g., Watson v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 268 F. App’x 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted). 
 162. E.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 163. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 15. 
 164. Id. at 16 (quoting Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 165. 93 F.3d at 1334. 
 166. Id. at 1335. 
 167. Id. at 1331. 
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VII . . . does not fall within this statute.”168 
 Following the same line of reasoning in Knox, the Third Circuit held 
in Jensen v. Potter that the anti-retaliation provision protects an 
employee from harassment by coworkers where “management knew or 
should have known about the harassment, but ‘failed to take prompt and 
adequate remedial action.’”169 In Jensen, after the plaintiff reported a 
sexual harassment claim to her employer, she was moved to a more 
hostile workstation and was constantly harassed for reporting her 
previous complaint to management.170 She reported this new harassment 
to her employer, but her employer did not attempt to curtail the 
workplace harassment, and after nineteen months of suffering, she filed 
a retaliation claim against her employer.171 The Third Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment and held the employer 
liable for not taking remedial action to curtail the coworker retaliatory 
harassment when it knew or should have known that the harassment was 
occurring.172  
The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits agree with the Seventh and 
Third Circuits’ interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.173 All 
three circuits have ruled that an employer will be held liable under the 
anti-retaliation provision for failing to act or stop coworker harassment 
in retaliation for an employee who participated in a lawfully protected 
activity, if the employer knows or should know about the harassment.174 
The Sixth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, acknowledged that it was 
following the majority interpretation when it reversed a lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the employer in a Title VII retaliation 
case.175 Along with following the majority’s negligence standard, the 
Sixth Circuit also affirmatively stated that an employer could be held 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 16–17 (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334, 1336) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d 
Cir. 1990)). Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2013) does not overrule 
Jensen with respect to the Third Circuit’s retaliation analysis. Instead, it addresses procedural 
formalities that petitioners must satisfy when filing Title VII claims with administrative 
agencies like the EEOC. Id. at 167. 
 170. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 447. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 453. By overturning a lower court’s summary judgment and establishing a new 
line of precedent that only one circuit court at the time had established, one can infer that the 
Third Circuit felt very confident in their interpretation of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision. 
 173. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 17. 
 174. Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds, 536 U.S. 919 (2002); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 
446 (2d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Watson v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 268 F. App’x 624, 626–
27 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 89–90, 95–97 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1994).  
 175. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 345–46 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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liable if it had “actual or constructive knowledge” of the coworkers’ 
retaliatory harassment.176 
The Tenth Circuit applies a stricter negligence standard in that an 
employer is only liable if management “know[s] about the [coworker] 
harassment and acquiesce[s] it in such a manner as to condone and 
encourage the coworkers’ actions.”177 While this does slightly differ 
from the majority negligence standard, it does not come close to the 
Fifth Circuit’s narrow standard that coworker harassment must be in 
furtherance of the employer’s business.178  
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have not affirmatively 
ruled in accordance with the majority negligence standard, but they 
have stated in dicta that they agree with the majority approach.179 In 
addition to the federal circuit court of appeals, most state courts that 
have addressed Title VII anti-retaliation issues agree with the majority 
negligence standard.180 For example, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court held that “an employer [may] be liable for co-worker retaliatory 
harassment for negligently failing to discover or remedy it.”181 Thus, 
most states and all federal circuits differ from the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis that coworker retaliatory harassment must be “in furtherance of 
the employer’s business.”182 This divergence from the majority’s 
reasoning ignores the underlying intent of the anti-retaliation statute, 
differs from Supreme Court precedent, and is a “Catch-22” standard that 
is nearly impossible to satisfy. 
IV.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S 
“IN FURTHERANCE” STANDARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A 
PRACTICAL SOLUTION 
The Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard is unique and 
unprecedented. The standard seems to contradict the legislative intent 
behind the anti-retaliation provision and ignores similar case law 
decided by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the standard legitimately 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 19 (quoting Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 
347) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 178. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 20.  
 179. See Csicsmann v. Sallada, 211 F. App’x 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2006); Carpenter v. Con-
Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 180. See, e.g., Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1045 (N.H. 2003); Channon v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 865 (Iowa 2001); Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 
751 A.2d 538, 548–49 (N.J. 2000). 
 181. Madeja, 821 A.2d at 1045 (citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 
1996)). 
 182. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long 
v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).  
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allows for coworker harassment to exist through a “Catch-22” loophole 
that enables employers to avoid liability. With these negative effects 
readily apparent to the Fifth Circuit, what is the best solution to remedy 
this problem? Should the Fifth Circuit fall in line with its sister circuits 
and amend its stringent and overbearing analysis? The answer is 
multifaceted but, put simply, the standard must change. 
A.  How the Standard Is Contrary to the Intent Behind the  
Anti-Retaliation Provision 
No textual provision in Title VII’s anti-retaliation statute suggests 
that discrimination against an employee must be employment related.183 
No such provision exists because Congress and the EEOC intended for 
the anti-retaliation provision to have a broad application that would 
protect any employee who had opposed discriminatory employment 
practices.184 By denying Ketterer’s retaliation claim because Ketterer 
was harassed by “ordinary employees” and not “in furtherance of the 
employer’s business,” the Fifth Circuit ignored the broad intent of the 
anti-retaliation provision.185 This disregard is evident when evaluating 
scenarios analogous to Hernandez. 
Consider the following scenario: An employee opposes an unlawful 
employment practice and, as a result, is harassed by his coworkers. The 
employer knows about the harassment but does nothing to remedy the 
situation. In theory, the Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard would 
let the employer off the hook as long as the harassment was not in 
furtherance of the employer’s business.186 This scenario begs the 
question: how often does employee harassment ever “further” the 
employer’s business? The answer, unsurprisingly, is very rarely. 
Moreover, it appears that the “In Furtherance” standard may only apply 
to scenarios where coworkers harass others to force them to work longer 
hours to benefit the employer.187 Regardless of the potentially 
applicable scenarios, the fact that it is difficult to even imagine a case 
where coworkers harass other employees to further the employer’s 
business evinces the limited application of the Fifth Circuit’s standard. 
Thus, by its very nature, the Fifth Circuit’s unique and limiting 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 184. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington, 548 U.S. 
at 65. 
 185. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–800 (1998) (acknowledging 
that it would be rare for harassment to be within the scope of employment, but refusing to hold 
categorically that it was always outside the scope of employment); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (1986) (“It would be the rare case where racial harassment against a 
co-worker could be thought by the author of the harassment to help with the employer’s 
business.”). 
23
Matthews: Illusory Protection: The Fifth Circuit’s Misguided Interpretation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1452 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
restrictions on Title VII retaliation claims in no way follows the 
statute’s purpose of “exceptionally broad protection.”188 
B.  How Supreme Court Precedent Can Help 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue 
presented in Hernandez, the Court has used a similar analyses in cases 
involving vicarious liability of employers.189 In Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton190 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,191 employees 
“sought to recover against the employer without showing [that] the 
employer [was directly] negligent or otherwise at fault.”192 The majority 
in both cases stated that “[a]n employer is negligent with respect 
to . . . harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct 
and failed to stop it.”193 Even the dissenting opinions in both cases 
recognized that the employer should be liable if he or she were 
negligent in allowing the supervisor’s conduct to occur.194 Thus, it 
seems improbable that the Court would differ in its interpretation of the 
Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard, especially when following the 
“broad” intent of the anti-retaliation provision.195 
C.  The Fifth Circuit’s Glorified “Catch-22” 
Another basic but important goal of the anti-retaliation provision is 
simply “avoiding harm to employees.”196 This is where the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision truly goes awry. 
Because the second prong of a prima facie retaliation claim is not 
established when the harassment by ordinary employees is not in 
furtherance of the employer’s business,197 almost all types of 
harassment by ordinary employees are allowed under the Fifth Circuit’s 
“In Furtherance” standard. Almost by definition, coworker harassment 
                                                                                                                     
 188. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 65 (2006). 
 189. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 25. 
 190. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 191. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 192. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting Burlington Indus., 524 
U.S. at 747) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Id. (summarizing the dissents in Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 767 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 
(2009) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197. See Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing that “the ‘in 
furtherance of the employer’s business’ aspect of the doctrine of respondeat superior suggests 
that liability requires a direct relationship between the allegedly discriminatory conduct and the 
employer’s business” (citing Shagner v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
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inherently “falls outside the scope of employment,”198 as “[i]t would be 
the rare case where . . . harassment . . . could be thought by the author 
of harassment to help the employer’s business.”199 This simple but 
important logic illustrates the “Catch-22” of the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning. By stating that the harassment by ordinary employees must 
be in furtherance of the employer’s business, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has 
effectively closed the door on co-worker retaliation claims that other 
circuits would entertain.”200 This extreme limitation on retaliation 
claims contradicts the statute’s legislative intent and can potentially 
deter employees who are gauging whether to oppose unlawful 
employment activities.201  
This potential and arguably unavoidable deterrent effect starkly 
contrasts the remedial nature of the anti-retaliation provision.202 The 
drafters of the anti-retaliation provision intended for the statute to limit 
employer retaliation as much as possible,203 regardless of whether it was 
“in furtherance of the employer’s business.”204 This stringent limitation 
imposed by the Fifth Circuit creates a judicial interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision that, in a way, significantly alters the statute’s plain 
meaning. By imposing this harsh standard on employees attempting to 
bring anti-retaliation claims, the Fifth Circuit is indirectly admitting that 
certain forms of workplace harassment are legal. This unfortunate 
reality is contrary to the fundamental purpose of the anti-retaliation 
provision and hopefully the Fifth Circuit will have a change of heart in 
the coming years. 
D.  A Practical Solution That Reflects Reality 
While there is no perfect answer as to how to interpret the anti-
retaliation provision, one thing is clear: the Fifth Circuit’s method is far 
from ideal. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning has created a higher standard 
for successful coworker retaliation claims and unfortunately, has limited 
many employees’ options along the way.205 The Fifth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800. 
 199. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis 
added).  
 200. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 155, at 6. 
 201. This deterrent effect conflicts with the legislative intent of the anti-retaliation 
provision. Fellows, supra note 33, at 423 (“Congress had made clear that one of the purposes of 
Title VII was to encourage private voluntary efforts to improve the racial situation in the United 
States.”). 
 202. See id. at 409 (noting that Title VII is a “remedial statute”). 
 203. See id. (“[Title VII], if ‘literally constructed,’ appears to prohibit all forms of racial 
discrimination in employment.”). 
 204. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long 
v. Eastfield Coll, 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 205. Amicus Curiae Brief of Employment Law Professors in Support of Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 18; Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012) (No. 11-1361). 
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limitation on what constitutes an adverse action is the reason for this 
higher standard and subsequently contradicts the intent behind the anti-
retaliation provision’s broad applicability.206 In order to conform with 
Supreme Court precedent, legislative intent, and a practical standard 
that is reasonably plausible to satisfy, the Fifth Circuit should eliminate 
its “in furtherance of the employer’s business”207 requirement and 
replace it with something similar to the negligence standard used by 
almost all circuit courts.208 The negligence standard prevents employers 
from turning a blind eye to coworker harassment without legal 
ramifications. The negligence standard holds employers accountable 
and allows employees to have a remedy besides simply finding another 
job. The negligence standard reinforces the public policy argument of 
fostering workplaces free of discrimination because, under the Fifth 
Circuit’s current standard, this goal is a true legal fiction. 
CONCLUSION 
John Ketterer witnessed firsthand the effects of workplace 
harassment against minorities. His sympathy toward minority 
employees led him to become good friends with them at his 
workplace.209 Unfortunately, this sympathy backfired and, because of 
his association with minorities, Ketterer endured severe harassment 
from his white coworkers.210 The worst part about this troubling 
situation is that, when Ketterer turned to the legal system for relief, he 
received none.211 The Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of the 
anti-retaliation provision is the fundamental reason why employees in 
situations similar to Ketterer’s are denied any sort of legal remedy for 
their credible retaliation claims.  
The primary objective of the anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination 
provision is to “avoid[] harm to employees.”212 The Fifth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                     
 206. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 65 (2006). 
 207. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th 
Cir. 1996)). Although Ketterer in Hernandez “urge[d the panel] to abandon [the Fifth Circuit’s] 
framework for coworker retaliation as articulated in Long,” the panel had to “decline [the] 
invitation” because “one panel of the court cannot overturn another.” Id. at 657–58. 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit will need to hear a case en banc to overrule Long. 
 208. For reminder purposes, the negligence standard and its variations are all in accordance 
with the underlying theory that an employer can be liable for retaliation if it knew or should 
have known about the harassment but tolerated or acquiesced in it. See supra Section III.B and 
accompanying text and footnotes. 
 209. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 4350. 
 210. Id. at 5170, 5246–48, 5492, 5836. 
 211. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 649 (affirming the district court’s grant of a summary 
judgment against Ketterer). 
 212. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 
(2009) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)). 
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reasoning undermines this objective and Ketterer’s lack of relief is a 
byproduct of this impractical interpretation. The Fifth Circuit should 
discontinue using its “In Furtherance” standard and should adopt the 
negligence standard as followed by the majority of circuit courts. 
Millions of employees who work in the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction are 
not afforded the same Title VII protections as other employees across 
the United States. The Fifth Circuit’s “Catch-22” interpretation of the 
anti-retaliation provision needs to change for the sake of employees 
who deserve the fundamental right to act against discrimination, without 
the fear of employment based retaliation. 
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